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Abstract 
Cloud computing is a new and increasingly popular form of IT outsourcing. It implies that a cloud 
service provider offers very standardized abstract IT services which are accessed by a user over 
the Internet. While cloud services are supposed to be very beneficial for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, the adoption of such services has been low in this group, among other reasons 
because of high complexity of the cloud market and trust concerns. This paper motivates the 
notion of cooperative cloud intermediaries as a solution for these concerns by building on  
well-known concepts: transaction cost theory, agency theory, the notion of intermediaries in 
electronic markets and the cooperative paradigm. We derive our solution in detail and show its 
viability in theory. 
1 Introduction 
Cloud computing is a new variety of IT outsourcing that has been gaining much attention over 
the last few years. In this paradigm, a cloud service provider (CSP) offers very standardized 
abstract IT services which are accessed over a network, usually the Internet. These services 
comprise products on different levels of abstraction, ranging from software usable by the  
end-user to “virtual” IT hardware. CSPs provide a seemingly unlimited supply of resources and 
allow users to quickly make use of more or less resources depending on the current demand 
while users pay only for the resources that are actually used ([2], [17], [18]). 
Whilst promising manifold benefits ([1], [2], [18], [21]), the cloud paradigm also means that  
end-users give up most of the control over implementation and operation of the systems, a fact 
that proves to be a significant obstacle for many companies, especially smaller ones ([10], [24]). 
In consequence, cloud computing is still “terra incognita” for most small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). According to recent studies ([10], [24]), the majority of SMEs is not yet using 
cloud services and has no plans of changing this in the foreseeable future. Major reasons for the 
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reluctant adoption are: lack of trust1 in the security of the cloud services and the CSPs, lack of 
control over processes in the cloud, e. g., with regard to billing, but also with regard to data 
protection, as well as lack of certainty about the legal compliance of the CSP and the cloud 
services with respect to contract design, accountability, and warranty. 
Various analyses of relevant information systems (IS) literature on IT outsourcing decisions 
show that transaction cost theory (TCT) is a widely-used explanation approach and it was shown 
to have yielded quite consistent results across a multitude of research studies ([4], [9], [27], [1]). 
We therefore draw on this theoretical framework and combine it with the concept of 
intermediaries to motivate our solution. In fact, we argue that a market-level approach is required 
to address these issues and suggest the concept of cooperative cloud intermediaries. In 
essence, these intermediaries are designed for SMEs to build trust into “their own cloud” and still 
benefit from (most of) the cost-efficiency of the cloud-computing paradigm. Our approach 
incorporates elements from the research on intermediaries in electronic markets, a community 
cloud approach as well as cooperative structures for the organization. 
2 Cloud Services and SMEs 
According to the widely accepted definition by the US NIST [18], cloud computing is 
characterized by five traits: (i) resource pooling, (ii) rapid elasticity, (iii) on-demand self-service, 
(iv) broad network access and (v) measured service. The term is generally used to refer not only 
to on-demand computing (i. e., CPU time) but to all kinds of cloud services, which can be 
classified by their service models as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service 
(PaaS) or Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) [18]. 
Arguably the most important trait of the cloud paradigm is the stringent abstraction that conceals 
all internal details of the cloud from the end-user. This abstraction allows CSPs to provide their 
cloud services flexibly and in the most cost-efficient way possible. However, this abstraction also 
means that the end-user gives up control over most aspects of data processing and IT 
operations. In particular, many potential cloud users are concerned about the security and 
privacy of their data [24]. Due to the abstraction provided by the cloud, it is unclear where the 
data is physically stored, who effectively could gain access to it and what data protection 
regulations apply (i. e., what laws of which country are applicable). 
The benefits of cloud services are well known and have been frequently discussed ([2], [1], [21], 
[18]) and they have been found particularly suitable for SMEs (e. g., [11]). Notwithstanding those 
benefits, SMEs also face the downsides of the cloud approach as insinuated above. Compared 
to large companies, they do not possess adequate means to address these concerns due to 
their small size. Specifically, legal aspects of cloud-sourcing contracts and trust concerns 
regarding the misuse of company data by a CSP cannot be adequately addressed by SMEs. 
They usually do not have enough staff to investigate new technologies, either. All things 
considered, cloud services are a very attractive IT outsourcing approach for SMEs, but 
widespread adoption is hindered by serious concerns of the SMEs ([10], [24], [11]). 
                                                     
1
 In this paper, trust is the expectation of a reliable partner who is motivated to abstain from opportunistic behavior 
([19]). The development of mutual trust in a partnership depends on each other’s integrity ([22], [3]). 
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3 A Case for Cloud Intermediaries 
In this section, we motivate the concept of cloud intermediaries (CIs). These intermediaries are a 
special type of middlemen who mediate the sourcing of cloud services between users (SMEs) 
and CSPs. Intermediaries have been shown to be advantageous in a variety of scenarios [10]. 
Our argument in favor of cloud intermediaries is two-fold. Firstly, we show that CIs are favorable 
in light of TCT2. Secondly, we highlight the benefits of CIs as seen from an SME’s perspective. In 
our analysis, we will focus on interactions initiated by potential cloud users, i. e., the SMEs, 
because this is the main direction for interactions in current cloud markets. Towards the end of 
this section, we highlight the limitations of the “plain CI” approach with regard to agency theory3. 
This shows that the concept of CIs requires further refinement, which is the topic of the 
subsequent Sections 4 and 5. 
3.1 Argumentation in Light of TCT 
TCT provides a framework for deciding whether a cloud intermediary (as a form of cooperation) 
is adequate or whether it is more suitable to purchase cloud services on the market. The 
decision is guided by Williamson’s principal dimensions of transactions, mainly the asset 
specificity (see [28]). An insourcing of cloud services, i. e., a hierarchy solution, can be neglected 
because SMEs generally lack know-how and scale to provide cloud services comparable to 
those available from third parties. Therefore, the alternatives are a cloud market solution and a 
hybrid solution where CIs provide possibilities for cooperation. 
Asset specificity is the most important and the most distinguished dimension in TCT. For an 
average cloud service, the asset specificity can be determined as medium high, which is one 
major indicator to organize these transactions in hybrid governance structures. This can be 
stated because no investments in stationary facilities are required (low site specificity), because 
some specific hardware devices potentially need to be purchased (medium physical asset 
specificity), and because the human resources have to be specialists in their field of business 
(high human specificity). With regard to a second dimension, uncertainty, SMEs have a need for 
reliable partners but also for stable governance structures that can support the development of 
trust, which indicates that a pure market is not an adequate coordination form. Hence, a cloud 
intermediary is most probably advantageous as a form of cooperation.  
Besides this non-formal argumentation, we now investigate, similar to the argument of Sarkar  
et al. [21], the situation where a potential cloud user u has to choose whether it is better to 
directly interact with a provider p (which causes the transaction costs T1 = Tu,p) or to engage an 
intermediary i that interacts with the provider on the user’s behalf (which brings about the 
transaction costs T2 = Tu,i + Ti,p) in a more formalized way. Unlike Sarkar et al. [21], however, our 
argument starts with a look at a group of Nu users that require a “similar” cloud service. 
  
                                                     
2
 In brevity, transaction cost theory (TCT) conceptualizes the outsourcing decisions as a search for the most  
cost-efficient alternatives, taking into account factors such as the strategic value of the IS in question  
(expressed as its “specificity”) as well as its role in a company’s processes [28]. 
3
 The theory of agency relationships is closely related to TCT. Whereas the latter considers contractual relationships 
more generally with an economic emphasis, agency theory studies interactions between actors who act under 
asymmetrical information [13]. 
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On the sellers’ side, there is a group of Np CSPs that offer suitable “similar” services. In order to 
find the optimal service and a CSP for their requirements, the SMEs will need to interact with 
each of the CSPs, e. g., to find out pricing details etc. From an economic perspective, the 
transaction costs for this alternative can thus be estimated as  
T1 = Nu · Np · T’u,p ,  (1) 
T’ being the average transaction costs. Using an intermediary incurs transaction costs of 
approximately 
T2 = Nu · Ni · T’u,i + Ni · Np · T’i,p.  (2) 
For our argument, we make the assumption of a single intermediary, i. e., Ni ≡ 1 (Assumption A1). 
Furthermore, we suppose Nu > 2, Np > 2 (Assumption A2) because the cloud services market 
would arguably be too simple to justify an intermediary otherwise. This is a rather weak 
assumption in light of actual cloud services markets with several hundreds or even thousands  
of participants. The situation, showing the interaction of a group of cloud users with a group of 
providers either with or without an intermediary, can, therefore, be depicted as shown in Figure 
1. In order for intermediaries to be beneficial, we require T1 > T2. 
  
Figure 1: TCT alternatives adopted from Sarkar et al. [21] 
The argument against intermediaries in electronic markets, also referred to as the 
disintermediation hypothesis (see [8]), is based on the assumption that electronic markets 
inherently reduce T’ to a very low common level T* (Assumption A3), which means that T1 = Tu,p 
= T* < Tu,i + Ti,p = 2 T
* = T2 for a setting with Nu = Np = 1, thus deducing that it is advantageous  
to drive intermediaries out of the market (see [21]). While Sarkar et al. argue that this is an 
unreasonably strong assumption (e. g., one would expect that Tu,i < Tu,p and Ti,p < Tu,p, even if 
overall Tu,p < Tu,i + Ti,p), we accept A3 for a first analysis, hence, Tu,p = Tu,i = Ti,p = T
* > 0. From 
(1), (2) and A1, it then follows that 
T1 = Nu · Np · T
*  as well as  T2 = Nu · T
* + Np · T
* = (Nu + Np) T
*,  (3) 
and hence also T1 > T2 because of A2, which implies Nu · Np > Nu + Np. From an economic point 
of view, it is therefore beneficial to have the hybrid coordination form of a cloud intermediary, 
even under the strong assumption A3. Additional observations in the course of this section will 
make this result even more articulated. 
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3.2 Benefits of a Cloud Intermediary from an SME’s Point of View 
As a first step, outsourcing parts of the IT of an SME to the cloud requires finding the optimal 
cloud service and CSP. A CI would, of course, have to undertake a similarly tedious search and 
screening process, just like other cloud users. Nevertheless, a CI can realize considerable 
economies of scale because the results of the search and screening are – with only small 
changes – applicable for a large group of SMEs. The intermediary would then allow sharing the 
transaction costs for search and screening (plus a premium charge for the mediation services) 
between many SMEs. Similarly, the interactions between the SMEs and the intermediary benefit 
from economies of scale when users request a variety of services from the same CI. Instead of 
coordinating with a whole crowd of CSPs, SMEs can lower their transactions costs by interacting 
with one CI as their single point of contact. As a result, the transaction costs for each individual 
SME can be reduced by the introduction of a CI, too. 
In addition, a CI can even provide ancillary benefits that outweigh parts of the transaction costs 
[12]. Notably, the search for information is facilitated by CIs providing reliable and processed 
information on eligible CSPs and services. They may, e. g., already have tested certain 
undocumented aspects of the service and can thus easily answer common concerns for a group 
of SMEs. In consequence, cloud intermediaries lower the entry barrier particularly for first-time 
and small-scale cloud users like SMEs. 
3.3 Linkage Alternatives for Cloud Intermediaries 
Based on the three general cases described by Klein and Teubner [14], we identify four 
conceivable settings for the linkage between cloud intermediary, customers and providers, 
differentiating linkage types 0 and III, which were originally treated as a single case [14]. 
0 Neutral cloud intermediary – The intermediary is formed as a completely independent 
company without any affiliation to CSPs or cloud users and acts as an independent 
consultancy or a marketplace for cloud services. 
I Buy-side cloud intermediary – The intermediary is the cloud users’ agent and is, thus, 
biased towards the cloud users’ interests. In this case, potential cloud users form a  
joint venture to bundle their cloud-related activities. Hence, the intermediary focuses on 
addressing the cloud users’ problems, such as the identification of suitable services, the 
selection of reliable and trustworthy CSPs, as well as many other aspects concerning 
questions of future provider changes etc. 
II Sell-side cloud intermediary – The intermediary is the CSPs’ agent, leading to an 
intermediary that represents the providers’ interests. 
III Joint cloud intermediary – The intermediary is equally linked to both cloud users and 
providers. It is a mixed group of small partners that would like to engage in close interaction 
on a medium to long-term basis. They jointly form a cloud intermediary around a common 
goal. 
It is clear that not all linkage variants are equally suitable to address the issues identified in the 
previous sections. Obviously, neither type 0 nor type II render the CI an agent of the cloud users, 
making these variants inadequate for ameliorating the identified issues. The joint cloud 
intermediary (type III) does act to some extent as the cloud users’ agent, but is only applicable 
for a very limited set of scenarios. This leaves linkage type I, the buy-side intermediary. Indeed, 
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this variant seems to be suited well to address both trust issues of the SMEs as well as issues 
concerning their positions in the cloud market. Since the main focus of our research is to 
address the concerns of small and medium-sized cloud users, variant I is the type of 
intermediary that will be examined more closely in the remainder of this paper. 
3.4 Conclusions from and Limitations of the “Plain CI” Approach 
SMEs face several selection problems when they want to engage in cloud-sourcing. An 
intermediary can reduce up-front costs and thus facilitate the cloud use for smaller enterprises.  
It also offers the benefits outlined in Section 3.2, such as providing virtual size and economies  
of scale, skill and scope. A cloud intermediary can therefore strengthen the market position of 
SMEs and provide valuable services or consultancy to them. Our results are in accordance with 
two “premises” made by Giaglis et al. [8] who propose (i) that intermediaries are likely to emerge 
in situations where market or product knowledge is important or products can be bundled as well 
as (ii) that intermediaries can add value by simplifying information search in scenarios where 
buying decisions are complex. Both apply for the cloud services domain and reinforce our 
argument. 
A widely acknowledged fact about cloud services, especially those on higher levels of 
abstraction (PaaS, SaaS), is the problem of vendor lock-in [6]. Due to a lack of standardized 
interfaces, the time and effort invested into integrating a particular cloud service into the IT 
landscape of an enterprise is very transaction-specific, leaving cloud users dependent on CSPs. 
In TCT, this phenomenon of transforming ex-ante unspecific services into ex-post specific ones 
is known as fundamental transformation. If the independent partner behaves opportunistically 
and cancels the transaction relationship, e. g., by discontinuing the service, the dependent 
partner would lose the transaction-specific quasi-rent4, which is high for specific commons and 
lower for generic goods. Successful cooperations, thus, require credible commitments by all 
parties involved. Commitments, however, easily lack credibility if the cooperation is organized  
by non-binding contracts only. 
As a first conclusion, a cloud intermediary can indeed minimize the transaction costs on both 
sides by matching buyers and sellers, by eliminating asymmetrical information distribution, by 
boosting transparency and by creating trust. Besides, a cloud intermediary aggregates the 
demands of many different SMEs. However, this subsection also presented some limitations  
of the CI approach that need to be addressed by applicative governance structures. In Section 4, 
apart from purely economic aspects, we will show possible implementation variants of a CI, 
moving closer to the technological level and further motivating the requirement of additional 
governance structures. A possible solution will then be presented in Section 5. 
4 Community Cloud Intermediaries 
4.1 A Community Cloud Approach for Cloud Intermediaries 
Broadly speaking, clouds can be distinguished by their delivery model into private and public 
clouds. In certain situations, it is beneficial for a defined group of organizations with a shared 
goal or concern to amalgamate the two models and form a so-called community cloud. 
                                                     
4
 The quasi-rent is the gap between the value of the current use of an asset and the value of its next best use.  
Highly specific assets have high quasi-rents because they cannot be repurposed easily [28]. 
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Essentially, this is a “non-public” cloud for a restricted audience, offering many of the benefits of 
a true private cloud [18]. 
Members of a community cloud control all services within it. This allows for sensitive functionality 
to be delivered in a cloud-like manner while preserving a much higher level of confidentiality and 
control for the cloud users. Thus, SMEs can establish a certain baseline of trust into the cloud 
services. Additionally, a community cloud can provide tailored services that are not available on 
the market, e. g., services that address certain regional regulations, or services complementing 
existing services, e. g., a transparent encryption layer on top of a public storage service. A major 
benefit of a hybrid community cloud is, therefore, that its users can access trusted “private” 
services when needed and leverage cost-efficient “public” services when possible. 
4.2 Implementation Variants for Community Cloud Intermediaries 
Based on varying degrees of out- vs. insourcing, there are three different implementation 
variants for a community cloud intermediary. Figure 2 shows three alternatives where SMEs 
(small circles) form an intermediary (large circle) that possibly contracts services from third-party 
CSPs (small rectangles). At one end of the scale, the full-service CSP (variant A) represents a 
solution that completely insources all cloud activities. At the other extreme, the cloud broker 
(variant B) does not provide any proper services but only establishes the connections to  
third-party providers, thus completely outsourcing all cloud services. Between these two 
extremes, a hybrid cloud intermediary (variant C) combines aspects of both variants by striking a 
balance between sourcing external services and providing proper services. Of course, this can 
be done in varying degrees on the whole scale from no to full cloud-sourcing. The three types 
are now discussed in more detail. 
 
Figure 2: Implementation variants for community cloud intermediaries 
Implementation Variant A: Full-service CSP 
A full-service cloud provider provides all cloud-related services and required infrastructure for the 
associated SMEs. It also bundles much of the know-how that the enterprises have on using and 
operating cloud services. In effect, this variant can be regarded as a traditional data center that 
has evolved into a cloud data center by extending its portfolio of services and adapting  
the underlying infrastructure operations. Usually, however, such a data center will not reach the 
dimensions that are required for realizing attractive economies of scale. Also, one main point  
of using “the cloud” is to eliminate the need for own infrastructure. So the full-service CSP is 
generally not an attractive variant for SMEs unless they already have invested considerably in  
a suitable infrastructure. 
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Implementation Variant B: Cloud Broker 
As an alternative to building one’s own cloud data center, it is possible to leverage existing  
third-party services. To do so, a cloud intermediary can set up contracts with external CSPs in 
the name of the associated SMEs, thus acting as cloud broker. The cloud broker can facilitate 
the use of cloud services by effectively “clearing the service jungle” so that SMEs can choose 
suitable services more easily. This approach can be a good starting point for making a first 
contact with the cloud but is not expected to be a viable long-term solution that addresses the 
identified issues. 
Implementation Variant C: Hybrid Cloud Intermediary 
Combining the merits of approaches A and B, a hybrid cloud intermediary can provide both 
proper (specialized, tailored) services as well as interfaces to third-party services in a public 
cloud. It allows SMEs to use proprietary “private” services for handling sensitive data, such as 
customers’ credit card data. At the same time, cost-efficient services from the public cloud can 
be leveraged where appropriate. Other than that, it can also offer services with specialized 
functionality, e. g., for addressing particular industry requirements. Just like the other variants,  
it also does not include any mechanism to establish trust between the SMEs that form  
the intermediary. In conclusion, this variant C allows SMEs to strike a balance between  
cloud-sourcing of cost-efficient services and in-sourcing of mission-critical services. It can 
provide several benefits but still lacks the ability to establish trust between participating SMEs. 
Nonetheless, it is the best out of the three alternatives discussed. For this reason we will build on 
this variant when we add cooperative governance structures to address the trust issue in the 
next section. 
5 Cooperative Structures for Cloud Intermediaries 
The external interdependency between an SME and its CSPs in a market solution leads to two 
major problems (cf. Section 3.4). Firstly, there is the problem of agents’ (i. e., CSPs’) 
opportunistic behaviors trying to exploit the less-informed and dependent principals (SMEs). 
Secondly, related to the opportunism problem, there is still a lack of trust in the CI. 
We suggest a solution based on cooperative paradigm5, thus forming cooperative cloud 
intermediaries (CCIs). Building on the results from the previous sections, such CCIs extend the 
hybrid cloud intermediary notion by adding cooperative governance structures. Hence, the hybrid 
cloud intermediary is formed as a cooperative by a group of cloud users (SMEs) that have 
shared goals with regard to their cloud activities but do not necessarily come from the same 
industry or may even be competitors. The cooperative instruments are then an effective means 
of handling opportunistic behavior and, thus, creating trust. 
The first effect of launching a cooperative is that the external interdependency between an SME 
and a CSP is replaced by an internal interdependency between the cooperative members. This 
internalization has to be advantageous for each CCI member to minimize the opportunistic 
behavior between the SMEs. Instead of contracting with an unknown external transaction 
partner, the SMEs help themselves by forming their own “meta-CSP” as a cooperative joint 
                                                     
5
 A cooperative is a business organization owned and operated by a group of individuals (or companies) with a 
common goal and for their mutual benefit. 
Digitale Bibliothek Braunschweig
http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00047437
Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik 2012  9 
venture. They now contract with the CCI, a partner they are involved in and that is democratically 
managed by the “one-man-one-vote”-principle6 balancing all members’ interests. This effectively 
favors smaller enterprises, which are usually not in a position to negotiate with a global CSP due 
to size mismatch (cf. [8]). A cloud user being also co-owner of a CCI, it has full control and trust 
in the CCI’s cloud services. The cooperative self-government prevents external interests from 
influencing the CCI. On a side-note, the CCI members are not required to purchase their cloud 
services through the CCI. In fact, the set-up is flexible to allow some member’s particular 
requirements that are out of the scope of the CCI to be fulfilled externally. In general, however, 
we expect the CCI members to channel their cloud activities through the intermediary because of 
the described advantages. 
The so-called cooperative mutualism is operationalized by the MemberValue, which is the total 
value of the members’ entrepreneurship and consists of three facets [23]. The direct 
MemberValue represents the value of having access to the CCI’s services, including both 
technical cloud services and non-technical services, such as consultancy. The indirect 
MemberValue stems from efficient value creation and payment flows (dividends) to the 
members. Finally, the sustainable MemberValue consolidates all values from investments to 
guarantee continuation and expansion of the CCI, e. g., investments for developing new and 
innovative services for the community cloud and its members. 
A CCI also creates virtual economies of scale. Inside a cooperative, the risk of selecting a wrong 
partner (adverse selection) is shared by all members, as are search costs for new members, 
services or optimal solutions. In addition, the CCI subsumes all members under a single entity, 
pooling their demands and, thus, enhancing bargaining power. Still, all members keep their 
identity and all SMEs remain self-dependent (co-called cooperative individualism). Although 
stability is generally ensured by cooperative statutory regulations, the barrier to enter or exit a 
cooperative for a single member is rather low. Lock-in costs are relatively small because 
members are entitled to a refunding of their deposit. However, it is problematic if a large part of 
the members exits simultaneously because that can easily overstrain the capacity of the CCI.  
In that case, the upkeep of proper operations might not be feasible. 
Lastly, a secure legal framework is extremely important for the dissemination of cloud services 
among the SMEs. With the establishment of a CCI, this can partly be guaranteed, particularly 
regarding critical aspects like privacy protection laws. It is also vital that members retain full 
access to their data and have the possibility to “withdraw” their data from the cloud whenever 
they want to. 
6 Limitations of the Current Approach 
Combining various economic approaches and theories we have demonstrated a solution for 
SMEs getting involved in cloud computing that can lower trust concerns. Our solution is 
advantageous under the assumptions mentioned. However, there are also some limitations  
to our approach. 
  
                                                     
6
 This is an important particularity of a cooperative where each member has exactly one vote, regardless of, e. g., 
financial size or any other measure of “importance”. 
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Cooperative structures are designed and profitable for a long-term perspective. They are, 
therefore, suitable neither for SMEs that want to engage in a single cloud project or very  
short-term cloud usage nor for SMEs that want to retain utmost flexibility with regard to their 
operations. From our research groups’ experiences, however, most SMEs are looking for 
medium to long-term relationships with their business partners. In our analysis, we have focused 
on comparing costs for two scenarios: a setting with an established intermediary and a setting 
without one. This ignores costs associated with the setup and launch of an intermediary, in 
particular also the costs of forming a cooperative. The launch of a CCI occasions, e. g., costs for 
searching founding members, marketing costs for finding more potential members later on, costs 
for setting up a shared infrastructure etc. Our analysis is valid, nevertheless, because the setup 
cost is negligible in long-term considerations. Also, it represents the situation where an SME 
decides on whether to join an already existing intermediary organization. We expect this to be 
the more frequent case once first CCIs are established. 
Finally, we have to highlight that cooperatives are a country-specific construct. Thus, it may not 
be feasible to adapt it for a particular country. However, our solution can be considered as a 
reference model that suits European legislature as well as cooperatives in the USA. Therefore,  
a very large part of cloud users are able to benefit from a CCI in principle. Some country-specific 
particularities will have to be respected, of course, and the cooperative governance structures 
have to be modeled adequately. 
7 Related Work 
The concept of intermediaries – also known as “middlemen”, “brokers” or “mediators” – is not 
new.  In the context of grid computing, for instance, “resource brokers” are suggested to help 
grid users satisfy their exact resource needs across various providers using a homogeneous 
interface [5]. Those brokers, however, are mainly conceived as software artifacts. Similarly, in 
data integration the term “mediator” is used to denote a software artifact that helps integrate and 
harmonize data from various sources [26]. All aforementioned intermediaries are almost purely 
technological. 
In the context of cloud computing, Gartner, Inc. has been researching the notion of “cloud 
service brokerages” since 2009.7  Whilst their primary focus is also rather technological (seeing 
brokers as integration platforms), they also make some remarks about organizational aspects of 
cloud service brokerages.  Applying the general traits of the intermediary notion to the cloud 
market, they see three main areas for cloud brokers: cloud service intermediation (extending 
existing services), aggregation (providing services across several CSPs), cloud service arbitrage 
(allowing easier switch to the best-fitting cloud) [16]. A first viable implementation of these cloud 
brokers is provided by CloudSwitch8. While the technological side of this research closely 
resembles our suggestions regarding a community cloud for a CCI, our focus lies on the market 
participants and the role of intermediary organizations rather than technological artifacts. To our 
knowledge, our research is the first on this particular question in the cloud context. 
                                                     
7
 http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1064712 
8
 http://www.cloudswitch.com 
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8 Conclusion and Future Work 
One major reason for many SMEs not to use cloud services is the lack of trust. On the one hand, 
this concerns data protection and data security issues. On the other hand, this concerns 
uncertainties regarding the legal situation surrounding cloud computing. We elaborated on the 
particular situation of SMEs and motivated the need for adequate governance structures. To 
address this, we have introduced an intermediary that helps find the right matches for buyers 
and sellersas well as create trust by reducing uncertainty and providing several additional 
benefits. We have shown that such an intermediary can minimize transaction costs between 
SMEs and CSPs. Addressing remaining trust concerns, we have motivated the introduction of a 
cooperative cloud intermediary that is organized as a cooperative community cloud and that can 
mitigate the lack of trust, control and certainty about legal issues as well as strengthen regional 
economic structures vis-à-vis global players. While the general notion of a cooperative has been 
around for decades, to our knowledge the specific application of the concept to the domain of 
cloud computing has not been investigated before. 
For the described approaches are still work in progress, they lack empirical confirmation. This is 
one of the major steps for our future work. In addition, we will have to identify the optimal size of 
a CCI that allows the cooperative to function in the most efficient way possible. Obviously, both 
having too few members in the CCI and having too many members is disadvantageous 
(because of lack of scale and too much coordination effort, respectively). Furthermore, the 
startup process of the CCI has to be explored in more detail, e. g., with regard to setup costs and 
optimal procedures. 
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